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Over the period lasting from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, Sweden ex-
perienced a sharp decline in wage inequality. Overall wage inequality fell
along with educational wage diﬀerentials and wage diﬀerentials between
younger and older workers. This development came to a halt in the mid-
1980s, and the subsequent years have seen a reversal of previous trends.
The rise in wage inequality since the mid-1980s has been particularly
marked for private-sector workers (le Grand et al. 2001).
The causes of the fall of Swedish wage inequality have been discussed in
Edin and Holmlund (1995), Hibbs (1990), and other contributions. Insti-
tutional factors almost certainly played a role. The so-called solidarity
wage policy pursued by the major trade union confederation was clearly at-
tempting to reduce wage diﬀerentials and appeared to have been success-
ful in these ambitions. However, there is also evidence that the usual supply
and demand factors played some role, in particular concerning the evolu-
tion of educational wage diﬀerentials. Changes in the university wage pre-
mium (college versus high school) are strongly negatively correlated with
changes in the relative supply of university educated people in the labor
force up to the mid-1990s. From the mid-1990s, however, this pattern no
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shops, and seminar participants at IFAU are gratefully acknowledged.longer holds. The university wage premium has continued to increase de-
spite a continuous increase in the relative supply of university-educated
people in the labor force (Gustavsson 2006).
Earlier studies of changes in Swedish wage inequality have been silent on
the question as to what extent the changes are attributable to changes in
dispersion between and within ﬁrms or plants. The main contribution of
the present chapter is to document how wage dispersion between and
within plants has evolved since the mid-1980s. We use hitherto largely un-
exploited data and ﬁnd a continuous rise in between-plant wage inequality.
This development may reﬂect increased sorting of workers by skill levels,
so that high-skilled and low-skilled workers to a greater extent are found in
diﬀerent plants. Another possibility is that the importance of rent sharing
at the plant level has increased, perhaps reﬂecting stronger local unions or
more scope for diﬀerential wage outcomes due to a greater between-plant
variation in the ability to pay. Our data do not allow clean tests of alterna-
tive hypotheses, but they suggest that both sorting and genuine plant ef-
fects may have become more important.
Our chapter also includes a fairly detailed descriptive analysis of the as-
sociations between worker mobility at the plant level and various measures
of wage inequality within and between plants. This analysis conﬁrms some
well-known stylized facts: most mobility takes place in the lower part of the
plant’s wage distribution, both in terms of exit and entry; mobility rates are
strongly procyclical; and smaller plants experience higher mobility.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. We begin in section 7.2 by giving 
a brief overview of the Swedish labor market institutions, the turbulent
macroeconomic events of the 1990s, and evolution of labor mobility and
ﬁxed-term contracts as a background to the later analysis of wages and mo-
bility.1 Section 7.3 describes the data, section 7.4 provides snapshots of
plant wages and mobility, and section 7.5 portrays in some detail the evo-
lution of the wage structure. Section 7.6 provides a discussion, and section
7.7 concludes.
7.2 Background
7.2.1 Employment Protection Legislation
Swedish legislation on employment protection dates back to the 1974
Employment Protection Act, which has remained largely intact over the
past three decades. The law presumes that an employment contract is valid
until further notice, unless stated otherwise. An employer must provide a
valid reason for terminating a contract. “Lack of work” is a valid reason,
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1. This section draws on various sources, in particular Holmlund (2003) and Holmlund and
Storrie (2002).and the employer’s assessment of whether there is lack of work cannot be
disputed in court. Workers have to be notiﬁed of layoffs several months
ahead of their implementation and layoffs must, in general, proceed ac-
cording to seniority. No redundancy pay is stipulated in the law, although
such pay may be part of employer-union deals at the plant level.
The legislation allows for temporary (ﬁxed-term) contracts. For ex-
ample, the law has always permitted the use of temporary contracts to
replace an absent worker. Another common form of temporary contract
involves project work in construction or research. Contracts for proba-
tionary periods are also allowed.
During the 1990s, there have been no signiﬁcant reforms of the Employ-
ment Protection Act concerning the termination of open-ended contracts.
There have, however, been several changes to the statutory regulation of
ﬁxed-term contracts. In January 1994, the maximum permitted duration
for probationary contracts and those motivated by a temporary increase in
labor demand were prolonged from six to twelve months. However, this
was immediately repealed in January 1995. The reforms of 1997 were ar-
guably more important. The employer was now given the opportunity to
hire for a ﬁxed duration without having to specify a particular reason.
However, an employer could only use a maximum of ﬁve such contracts,
and a particular individual could not be employed under such a contract
for more than twelve months during a three-year period. If the plant is
newly established, the period may be extended to eighteen months.
Another important element of the 1997 law was the opportunity to strike
collective agreements on derogations from statutory law regarding ﬁxed-
term contracts at the local level, provided that the parties had a central
agreement in other matters. Prior to 1997, these agreements could only be
made at the central level.
Comparisons with employment protection in other countries suggest
that the Swedish legislation is relatively stringent, although not as stringent
as in several Southern European countries (see Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2004).
7.2.2 Collective Bargaining
Union density in Sweden has hovered above or around 80 percent of the
number of employees over the past couple of decades. The coverage of col-
lective agreements is even higher, as the collective agreements typically are
extended to nonunion workers. A high degree of union membership is an
integral part of what has been referred to as the Swedish Model. Indeed, la-
bor legislation concerning employment protection and worker codetermi-
nation is based on the presumption that the overwhelming majority of the
workers are union members.
The fact that the provision of unemployment insurance is closely linked
to union membership is almost certainly an important explanation of the
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density—Denmark, Finland, and Iceland—also organize their unemploy-
ment insurance through union-aﬃliated insurance funds. There is by now
a reasonable amount of evidence suggesting that such institutional details
explain some of the country diﬀerences in unionization (see, e.g., Boeri,
Brugiavini, and Calmfors 2001).2
Postwar wage determination in Sweden has frequently been associated
with centralized wage bargaining as well as so-called solidarity wage pol-
icy. Nationwide coordination of wage negotiations was implemented from
the mid-1950s and continued for almost three decades. The key players 
in these negotiations were the Swedish trade union confederation (LO) and
the Swedish employers’ federation (SAF). The guiding principle for LO’s
wage policy, as laid out in several inﬂuential documents by their econo-
mists Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, was “equal pay for equal work.”
One implication of this principle was that wages should not be made de-
pendent on the ability to pay among particular plants or industries. In the-
ory, the policy recognized the need for wage diﬀerentials among workers so
as to reﬂect diﬀerences in qualiﬁcations. In practice, there was always a
clear egalitarian ambition in LO’s wage demands.
The centralized wage negotiations came under increasing stress during
the late 1970s, when some employer organizations argued that the central
frame agreements left too little room for ﬂexibility at the local and indus-
try level. A signiﬁcant step toward more decentralized wage bargaining
came in 1983, when the metalworkers’ union and their employer counter-
part sidestepped the national negotiations and opted for an industry agree-
ment. Wage negotiations after 1983 have mainly taken place at the in-
dustry level, albeit with exceptions in the early 1990s when double-digit 
inﬂation and an emerging macroeconomic crisis led the government to ini-
tiate a coordinated “stabilization drive” so as to achieve a deceleration of
wage inﬂation. The drive took the form of a government-appointed com-
mission that delivered a proposal for economy-wide wage restraint for the
period 1991 to 1993. This involved negotiations with over 100 organiza-
tions, and the proposal was ﬁnally accepted across the whole labor market.
The following years involved a return to largely uncoordinated industry-
wide bargaining.
In the summer of 1996, several blue-collar unions in the manufacturing
sector launched an important initiative that eventually materialized as the
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2. Union density has fallen sharply over the period 2006 to 2007. By October 2007, union
density stood at 72 percent according to data from the labor force surveys (Kjellberg 2007).
This development can almost certainly be largely explained by new policies concerning the ﬁ-
nancing of unemployment insurance that came into eﬀect in 2007. The policies raised the cost
of being insured and has resulted in a sharp fall in membership in unemployment insurance
funds. A substantial number of workers leaving the unemployment insurance funds have also
chosen to leave the unions.so-called Industrial Agreement (IA) of 1997. The agreement was struck by
the blue- and white-collar unions as well as employer organizations in the
industrial sector and was mainly concerned with procedural “rules of the
game.” It represented an attempt to establish consensus around timetables
for negotiations, the role of mediators, and rules for conﬂict resolution. 
A group of “impartial chairs” have been appointed, and the agreement
states rules for when and how these chairs could intervene in the negotia-
tion process.
The IA has served as a model for similar agreements in the public sector
(and also in parts of the service sector). As of 2002, over 50 percent of the
labor force is covered by IA-type agreements. The IA also came to serve 
as a model for government policies concerning industrial relations. A new
national mediation institute (Medlingsinstitutet) has been created (in oper-
ation from June 2000) with the power to appoint mediators even without
the consent of the parties concerned.
The IA innovations that emerged in the late 1990s represent a move to-
ward more informal coordination in wage bargaining. Perhaps paradoxi-
cally, the move toward informal macro-coordination in wage bargaining
has taken place simultaneously with a clear shift toward stronger local
inﬂuence over the distribution of wage increases. Pay setting in the public
sector is a case in point. Previous rigid wage scales have been abandoned,
and there is, at least in theory, substantial room for wage adjustments tai-
lored to the needs of recruiting and retaining employees.
7.2.3 The Macroeconomy in Turmoil
During the 1980s, Swedish labor market performance was widely appre-
ciated as a remarkable success story. Whereas unemployment in Western
Europe climbed to double-digit ﬁgures, the Swedish unemployment rate
remained exceptionally low by international standards. The average un-
employment rate during the 1980s was around 2 percent, and by the end of
the decade, it had fallen to 1.5 percent. Employment-to-population rates
were also exceptionally high by international standards. In 1990, total em-
ployment had risen to 83 percent of the working age population, whereas
the average European ﬁgure was 61 percent, and the OECD average was 65
percent.
In the early 1990s, the picture of outstanding Swedish labor market per-
formance changed dramatically. Between 1990 and 1993, unemployment
increased from 1.6 percent to 8.2 percent, and total employment declined
to 73 percent of the working age population (see table 7.1). The level of
gross domestic product (GDP) fell from peak to trough by 6 percent over
a three-year period. For ﬁve successive years in the mid-1990s, oﬃcial un-
employment was stuck at around 8 percent, whereas extended measures of
unemployment reached double-digit ﬁgures.
Why did Swedish unemployment rise so sharply in the early 1990s? It can
Wage Dispersion between and within Plants: Sweden, 1985–2000 221be argued that the main causes were a series of adverse macroeconomic
shocks, partly self-inﬂicted by bad policies and partly caused by unfavor-
able international developments. The policy failures date back to the 1970s
and include an inability to pursue a suﬃciently restrictive aggregate de-
mand policy so as to bring inﬂation under control. This inﬂationary bias in
policy was especially pronounced in the late 1980s, when it was fueled by
ﬁnancial liberalization. The timing of ﬁnancial liberalization and a major
tax reform in 1990 to 1991, which contributed to a slump in the housing
market, was not well designed. When macroeconomic policy ﬁnally took a
ﬁrm anti-inﬂationary stand in 1991, the economy was already edging to-
ward recession. The depth of the recession was reinforced by the interna-
tional recession of the early 1990s and by increasing real interest rates.
Although the prospects for a sustained labor market improvement ap-
peared remote in the mid-1990s, a strong recovery was, in fact, around the
corner. From 1997 and onward, employment exhibited a marked increase
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Table 7.1 Macroeconomic conditions
Economic growthc
Year Unemploymenta Employmentb 1 year 2 year 5 year
1980 2.0 79.9 1.67 5.57 6.83
1981 2.5 79.4 –0.19 1.47 5.51
1982 3.2 79.1 1.24 1.05 8.55
1983 3.5 79.0 1.88 3.14 8.68
1984 3.1 79.4 4.31 6.27 9.18
1985 2.8 80.3 2.22 6.62 9.77
1986 2.7 80.9 2.79 5.07 13.04
1987 2.1 81.4 3.40 6.28 15.45
1988 1.7 82.2 2.60 6.09 16.27
1989 1.5 82.9 2.75 5.42 14.53
1990 1.6 83.1 1.03 3.80 13.20
1991 3.0 81.0 –1.08 –0.06 8.94
1992 5.2 77.3 –1.18 –2.25 4.11
1993 8.2 72.6 –2.00 –3.15 –0.56
1994 8.0 71.5 4.16 2.09 0.82
1995 7.7 72.2 4.05 8.39 3.84
1996 8.1 71.6 1.29 5.40 6.32
1997 8.0 70.7 2.44 3.76 10.22
1998 6.5 71.5 3.65 6.17 16.56
1999 5.6 72.9 4.58 8.39 17.03
2000 4.7 74.2 4.33 9.10 17.33
2001 4.0 75.3 0.92 5.29 16.91
Note: Numbers in bold refer to the years studied in section 7.4.
aShare of labor force.
bShare of working aged (sixteen to sixty-four) population.
cChange in real GDP.and unemployment fell precipitously. By the end of 2000, unemployment
had reached 4 percent of the labor force, and it remained fairly constant at
this level during 2001 and 2002. To some degree, this recovery reﬂects the
unwinding of earlier shocks and a return to what may be close to the equi-
librium unemployment rate. There is little doubt that the extremely low
unemployment rate around the 1990s was not sustainable. Over the 1990s,
several reforms may have facilitated a return to lower equilibrium unem-
ployment. For example, unemployment insurance became less generous, a
number of deregulations in product markets took place, and labor market
reforms opened up for temporary work agencies.
7.2.4 Labor Mobility and Temporary Contracts
Available measures of labor mobility in Sweden reveal strong cyclical
patterns. However, any statements about cycles versus trends are problem-
atic considering the exceptionally deep and prolonged slump of the early
1990s. A noticeable change is the rapid growth of ﬁxed-term employment
contracts.
One source of information on labor mobility is the retrospective labor
force surveys. Data on external job mobility—change of employer at least
once during the past year—reveal annual mobility rates hovering between
6 and 12 percent since the mid-1960s. There is some evidence that internal
mobility—change of position without changing employer—has shown a
slight trend increase, at least up to the late 1980s.
Overall labor turnover has been markedly procyclical, with quits ac-
counting for the overwhelming share of the total number of worker sepa-
rations. For blue-collar workers in mining and manufacturing, the annual
quit rate amounted to 22 percent over the period 1968 to 1988, to be com-
pared with an average annual layoﬀrate of only 2 percent.3The importance
of layoﬀs increased substantially during the slump of the 1990s, but sepa-
rate data on quits and layoﬀs are not available after 1988. Other evidence,
such as information on unemployment inﬂow and advance notiﬁcation of
layoﬀs, indicates sharply rising layoﬀ rates in the early 1990s.
The distinction between quits and layoﬀs is often fuzzy, and especially
fuzzy for ﬁxed-term contracts that have grown relentlessly during the
1990s. As shown in ﬁgure 7.1,the sharp fall in total employment in the early
1990s was due to sharply falling employment in open-ended contracts. The
number of ﬁxed-term contracts stood at approximately the same level in 
the ﬁrst quarter of 1994 as it did four years earlier. When the economy ap-
proached the cyclical peak in the late 1980s, we observe rising permanent
employment along with a decline in the number of ﬁxed-term contracts.
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3. Quits are worker separations “initiated by the employee,” whereas layoﬀs are separations
“initiated by the employer.” The data are based on surveys to ﬁrms and were collected by
Statistics Sweden. Empirical studies of worker mobility in Sweden up to the early 1980s are
reported in Holmlund (1984).From the early 1990s and during most of the rest of the decade, there is a
remarkable increase in ﬁxed-term contracts that amounts to roughly 50
percent. Measured relative to total wage and salary employment, the num-
ber of temporary workers rose from 10 percent to 16 percent; see ﬁgure 7.2.
Note, however, the declining share of ﬁxed-term contracts in the late 1980s
and the late 1990s, periods with falling unemployment.4
The prevalence of ﬁxed-term contracts is particularly visible among
women, the young, and foreign-born residents. By the turn of the century,
18 percent of the female employees were on ﬁxed-term contracts, a ﬁgure
to be compared with 13 percent for the male employees. The trend rise in
temporary work is striking for both men and women. Among young fe-
male workers aged sixteen to twenty-four, close to 60 percent were in tem-
porary work by the end of the century; the corresponding share for young
men was around 40 percent.
Temporary work has increased in every broad sector of the economy. Two
sectors stand out. Financial and business services exhibit both the greatest
increase in ﬁxed-term contract rate and share of all ﬁxed-term contracts,
while health and care show the lowest growth rates in both these ﬁgures.
The most frequent form of ﬁxed-term contracts involves replacement of
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4. Fixed-term contracts account for a much higher share of the total ﬂow of new hires than
of the total stock of employment. Available data for the private sector reveal that ﬁxed-term
contracts accounted for roughly 50 percent of all new hires in the late 1980s. By the late 1990s,
they accounted for some 70 percent.
Fig. 7.1 Wage and salary employment (100s) by type of contract, seasonally ad-
justed quarterly data 1987Q1 to 2004Q2
Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden.absent workers. Sweden has a generous allowance for many forms of leave,
particularly parental leave and long statutory holidays. The incidence of
leave replacements has, however, remained roughly constant at around 4 to
5 percent of total wage and salary employment. The entire rise in tempo-
rary work is accounted for by other categories, namely on-call contracts,
project work, and probationary employment.
Why did ﬁxed-term contracts exhibit such rapid growth during the
1990s? Holmlund and Storrie (2002) discuss this issue and conclude that
legislative changes are unlikely to be crucial. Changes in the industrial
structure of employment, or in the demographic composition of the labor
force, have likewise negligible explanatory power. A more promising ex-
planation focuses on the consequences of adverse macroeconomic condi-
tions. A recession is associated with relatively more hirings on temporary
contracts, reﬂecting weaker incentives on the part of ﬁrms to oﬀer long-
term contracts when workers are easier to ﬁnd as well as an increased will-
ingness on the part of workers to accept temporary work when job oﬀers
are in short supply. The Swedish experience as well as the developments of
temporary work in the other Nordic countries lends support to this hy-
pothesis. The share of temporary work has been relatively stable in Norway
(with stable or falling unemployment) but increased sharply in Finland
over the 1990s—that is, a period when Finnish unemployment skyrocketed.
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Fig. 7.2 Temporary work (percent of total wage and salary employment) and un-
employment (percent of the labor force), seasonally adjusted quarterly data 1987Q1
to 2004Q2
Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden.The trend rise in temporary work over the 1990s may thus to a signiﬁ-
cant degree reﬂect changes in the macroeconomic environment and, in par-
ticular, the rise in unemployment from the exceptionally low (and unsus-
tainable) levels in the late 1980s to the much higher (and presumably
sustainable) levels prevailing in recent years. In addition, other, more
“structural” forces may have tilted employers’ preferences toward more
ﬂexible staﬃng arrangements, but it is diﬃcult to pinpoint the exact causes.
Hiring labor on a ﬁxed-term contract can accommodate ﬂuctuations in the
workload associated with a volatile market environment, but evidence on
increased volatility is hard to come by.5
7.3 Data
In order to study wage dispersion, wage changes, and mobility, we use a
linked employer-employee database containing information on all workers
and plants in both the private and public sectors. From the database, we de-
rive measures of wage levels, wage changes, mobility, and tenure. Through
the employer-employee link, we are able to derive plant aggregates of these
measures as well as measures of wage dispersion at the plant level. In ad-
dition to these core measures, we also use information on observable char-
acteristics (age, gender, immigrant status, and education) of the workers.
The basic data source is a version of a register database (RAMS) pro-
vided by Statistics Sweden. The RAMS database contains yearly plant-
level data on all workers that were employed at a plant some time during
each year, irrespectively of whether they were employed on a ﬁxed-term or
a permanent contract. The data include information on total annual earn-
ings as well as the ﬁrst and the last remunerated month for each employee.
We construct monthly wage data by dividing total earnings during the year
by the number of remunerated months, including only employment spells
that cover November each year. Thus, we use the average monthly wage-
bill paid to an employee by a single employer as our measure of the em-
ployee’s wage.
The data are yearly and cover the period 1985 to 2000. The underlying
population consists of all individuals aged sixteen to sixty-ﬁve who resided
in Sweden anytime between 1990 and 2000. This implies that the oldest
workers as well as workers who emigrated or died before 1990 are missing
during the ﬁrst ﬁve years. Thus, in eﬀect, we have an age restriction of six-
teen to sixty in 1985 and sixteen to sixty-four in 1989.
The data do not contain information on hours worked, so in order to
focus on workers that are reasonably close to full-time employment, we
consider a person to be full-time employed if and only if the wage for No-
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5. Houseman (2001) reports from a survey of U.S. employers that ﬂexible staﬃng arrange-
ments are mainly used to accommodate ﬂuctuations in workload or absences.vember exceeds a minimum wage.6 Furthermore, an individual is only
counted as employed by at most one plant each year, with priority given to
the observation generating the highest wage.
The data set is based on information on total labor earnings collected for
the purpose of calculating taxes. Thus, the data include the earnings of all
employees, including top chief executive oﬃcers (CEOs), which implies
that some of the observations are extreme outliers. It should be noted that
there is great persistence over time in the recorded wages of these individ-
uals, suggesting that the extreme values are not due to errors. As is evident
from table 7.2, the wages of the top earners have a large impact on the stan-
dard deviation of monthly wages, while the mean hardly is aﬀected at all
(this pattern is, of course, even more noticeable when looking at wages in
levels). It might be misleading if a very small number of workers inﬂuence
the statistics in such a dramatic way, especially when comparing to other
data sets where this group may be excluded by construction. On the other
hand, wages of top earners within each plant are the focus of parts of this
chapter. Considering this, we retain all but the top 0.5 percent in the wage
distribution in the relevant years. In an eﬀort to reduce the impact of mea-
surement errors in changes, we also rank individuals according to their log
wage change and drop the highest and lowest half-percentile each year.
Table 7.3 compares the constructed wage distribution to the “actual”
wage distribution, calculated from the 3 percent random sample in the
Longitudinal Individual Data Base (LINDA; see Edin and Fredriksson
2000). The constructed data correspond reasonably close to the actual data
when looking at log wages but appear to contain some noise in the esti-
mated dispersion of both wages and wage changes.
The individual identiﬁers are based on oﬃcial personal identiﬁcation
numbers, which should be very accurate and consistent over time. How-
ever, plant identiﬁers may change over time for administrative reasons. In
order not to misclassify the disappearance of administrative plant num-
bers as plant closings, we only include plants that existed in two consecu-
tive years when studying changes (and, for comparability, throughout sec-
tion 7.4). Thus, the calculated exit rates (i.e., the fraction of employees in a
plant that leave within a year) does not include plant closings. Because our
tenure variable is calculated within the sample, changes in administrative
plant numbers will probably mean that we underestimate the fraction of
long-tenured workers. When calculating wage changes for people who
change plants, we only include people who changed between plants with at
least twenty-ﬁve employees in both years in order to get consistency with
the deﬁnition used elsewhere in this analysis.
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6. The minimum wage is deﬁned as 75 percent of the mean wage of janitors employed by lo-
cal municipalities, according to Statistics Sweden’s information on monthly wages; the cutoﬀs
are available upon request.Our analysis is focused on the corporate sector,7 and in order to get a
meaningful description of the wage dispersion within establishments, we
include only plants with at least twenty-ﬁve employees. Table 7.4 displays
the relative size of the corporate sector for the years 1985 and 2000.8We in-
clude both a measure where we use the entire corporate sector and one
where we restrict the analysis to the private corporations. It is shown that
the size of the corporate sector, as measured in number of employees, in-
creased slightly between 1985 and 2000 (from 63 to 66 percent).
Table 7.4 also shows the share of workers in each sector who worked in
plants with at least twenty-ﬁve employees. It is shown that 59 percent of in-
dividuals employed in the corporate sector in 2000 worked in 25  sized
plants; the corresponding number for 1985 was 57 percent. Figure 7.3
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7. The main reason is to get comparability with other studies in the volume.
8. The sector deﬁnitions are based on Statistics Sweden (SCB; 2001) and SCB (2002) and
comply with European Union (EU)-standard classiﬁcations.
Table 7.2 The importance of extreme values (2000)
Log of nominal monthly wage in 2000
Highest included percentile Mean Standard deviation Max.
95 9.820 0.283 10.54
99 9.855 0.328 10.98
99.5 9.862 0.338 11.19
99.9 9.868 0.351 11.75
All 9.870 0.359 15.07
Note: Total sample size is 3,040,555 individuals.
Table 7.3 Actual and constructed nominal monthly wages (2000)
Changes in log wage 
(from 1999) Log (wages)
Constructed Actual Constructed Actual
Mean 9.860 9.876 0.051 0.054
Standard deviation 0.336 0.283 0.149 0.116
10th percentile 9.453 9.585 –0.093 –0.022
Median 9.821 9.818 0.042 0.037
90th percentile 10.309 10.258 0.216 0.165
N 2,999,065 105,633 2,602,351 88,864
Note:The observations with the largest (and smallest for the actual data) 0.5 percent of wages
as well as the largest and smallest 0.5 percent of log wage changes are excluded from the data.shows the log plant-size distribution for 2000. It is obvious that most 25 
sized plants have close to twenty-ﬁve employees, and, as a consequence, a
signiﬁcant fraction of plants move around the twenty-ﬁve limit between
years. However, as noted in the preceding, we will condition on plants hav-
ing at least twenty-ﬁve employees in both years whenever we calculate
changes.
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Table 7.4 Sector and size
Relative size of sector 
(no. of employees)
Share of all employees 
All plants and  Employees in size in sector working in
employees 25  plants only size 25  plants
1985
All corporate 0.63 0.62 0.59
Private 0.52 0.48 0.55
Public and nonproﬁt 0.37 0.38 0.63
2000
All corporate 0.66 0.62 0.57
Private 0.60 0.54 0.55
Public and nonproﬁt 0.34 0.38 0.68
Note: Size is the total number of employees each year.
Fig. 7.3 Plant size distribution for 2000: Corporate sector7.4 Snapshots of Plant Wages and Mobility
This section provides detailed descriptive evidence of wages, wage
changes, and mobility at the plant level in the Swedish private corporate
sector for the years 1986, 1990, 1995, and 2000. The purpose of the anal-
ysis is to provide an overview of the role of plants in shaping wages, wage
changes, and labor mobility in Sweden since the 1980s, in order to facili-
tate comparisons with other countries and depict the most important
changes that have occurred during the period under study.
The analysis is based only on plants in privately owned ﬁrms in the cor-
porate sector. It is worth noting that the period under study was charac-
terized by a steady increase in the share of workers in private plants within
the corporate sector: in 1986, only 77 percent of workers worked in plants
owned by private ﬁrms, whereas the corresponding share was 87 percent in
2000 (see table 7.4).
Because the focus of this section is on describing the pattern and changes
in wages and turnover at the plant level, most statistics are calculated with
one plant as one observation, implying that all included plants have an
equal weight. Thus, small plants are up-weighted compared to an analysis
based on individuals.
7.4.1 Wage Levels
Figure 7.4 shows the log real wage distribution for the four years studied
(wages are deﬂated by the consumer price index). The ﬁgure reveals a
steady increase in real wages, but also an increase in dispersion. This is also
shown by the ﬁrst panel of table 7.5, where the standard deviation of log
wages increases from 0.307 to 0.340 between 1986 and 2000. This repro-
duces what is a well-known fact from several previous studies, namely that
the wage dispersion in Sweden started to increase in the mid-1980s after
several decades of wage compression.9
The second panel of table 7.5 shows that the between-plant dispersion,
measured as the standard deviation of plant average wages, increased over
time. As a contrast, the third panel shows that the within-plant dispersion,
measured as the mean of the within-plant standard deviation of wages, 
remained relatively constant over time. This impression also holds in the
fourth panel showing statistics for the coeﬃcient of variation within plants.
Thus, it appears as though the prime source of increased dispersion is be-
tween, rather than within, plants. We will return to this issue at length in
section 7.5 of the paper.
The ﬁfth panel of table 7.5 reveals a positive correlation between the
wage level in a plant and the wage dispersion within the plant. This result is
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9. See, for example, Le Grand, Szulkin, and Thålin (2000), Edin and Holmlund (1995), and
Gustavsson (2004).probably, at least partly, driven by the skewness of the wage distribution
(see ﬁgure 7.4). The wage dispersion among high-paid people is larger even
in relative terms.10
The last two panels of table 7.5 show the evolution of wage dispersion for
young (twenty-ﬁve to thirty) and old (forty-ﬁve to ﬁfty) workers. The re-
sults show that the increase in wage dispersion was larger for young work-
ers than for prime-aged workers. However, if we compare the log wages for
youths to the average log wages displayed in the top panel, we see that youth
wages appear to have remained relatively stable at approximately 90 per-
cent of the average wage over the period.
7.4.2 Wage Changes
In this subsection, we study wage changes within and between plants. In
doing so, we only look at changes for workers that are employed by plants
in the sample (i.e., by plants with at least twenty-ﬁve employees in the
private corporate sector) in two consecutive years. Figure 7.5shows the dis-
tribution of wage changes for the four years studied. It can be noted that
many workers experienced a real wage decline between 1989 and 1990.
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10. Some caution is warranted when comparing these numbers to other data sources be-
cause the used data are rather unique in including the earnings of all people receiving remu-
neration from each plant, including top CEOs. Note, however, that we, as explained in section
7.3, excluded the top 0.5 percent of wages each year.
Fig. 7.4 The distribution of log real wages
Note: Deﬂated by CPI to 1990:SEK.Table 7.5 Structure of wages within and between plants
Wages (1990-SEK)a Log wages (1990-SEK)a
1986b 1990 1995 2000 1986 1990 1995 2000
1. Average wage 12,976 13,797 14,865 17,843 9.420 9.477 9.553 9.727
SD 4,572 4,996 5,346 7,040 0.307 0.322 0.318 0.340
90 percentile 18,832 20,069 21,606 26,716 9.843 9.907 9.981 10.193
75 percentile 14,544 15,649 16,711 20,055 9.585 9.658 9.724 9.906
Median 11,848 12,696 13,668 16,070 9.380 9.449 9.523 9.685
25 percentile 9,992 10,525 11,462 13,437 9.210 9.262 9.347 9.506
10 percentile 8,519 8,728 9,570 11,208 9.050 9.074 9.166 9.324
No. of workers 692,870 800,332 739,378 860,581 692,870 800,332 739,378 860,581
2. Plant average wage 12,678 13,490 14,432 17,245 9.396 9.455 9.521 9.692
SD 2,088 2,266 2,679 3,663 0.145 0.152 0.169 0.188
90 percentile 15,699 16,680 18,143 22,497 9.603 9.664 9.751 9.959
75 percentile 13,664 14,586 15,855 19,008 9.478 9.541 9.624 9.801
Median 12,228 13,076 13,935 16,397 9.376 9.440 9.505 9.665
25 percentile 11,239 11,953 12,554 14,698 9.297 9.353 9.407 9.561
10 percentile 10,448 11,003 11,501 13,413 9.227 9.272 9.318 9.472
No. of plants 7,047 8,306 7,526 9,067 7,047 8,306 7,526 9,067
3. Plant SD of wages 3,820 4,168 4,404 5,484 0.266 0.279 0.273 0.279
SD 1,387 1,416 1,626 2,222 0.064 0.060 0.066 0.069
90 percentile 5,830 6,219 6,678 8,635 0.355 0.361 0.361 0.371
75 percentile 4,702 5,029 5,459 6,917 0.308 0.317 0.317 0.326
Median 3,595 3,924 4,151 5,047 0.260 0.274 0.267 0.272
25 percentile 2,775 3,119 3,159 3,794 0.220 0.238 0.226 0.228
10 percentile 2,206 2,546 2,474 2,936 0.186 0.207 0.192 0.195
No. of plants 7,047 8,306 7,526 9,067 7,047 8,306 7,526 9,067
Plant CV of wages 0.296 0.305 0.300 0.312 0.028 0.030 0.029 0.029
SD 0.076 0.072 0.080 0.088 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007
90 percentile 0.392 0.399 0.406 0.429 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.038
75 percentile 0.349 0.356 0.356 0.371 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
Median 0.294 0.302 0.298 0.306 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028
25 percentile 0.240 0.253 0.242 0.247 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.024
10 percentile 0.197 0.212 0.196 0.200 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.020
No. of plants 7,047 8,306 7,526 9,067 7,047 8,306 7,526 9,067
4. Correlation (average 
wage, SD of wage) 0.782 0.758 0.742 0.768 0.591 0.499 0.480 0.499
5. Wages for workers 
aged 25–30 11,910 12,716 13,318 16,258 9.358 9.419 9.467 9.657
SD 2,950 3,321 3,456 4,929 0.230 0.249 0.243 0.276
90 percentile 15,521 16,772 17,305 22,121 9.650 9.727 9.759 10.004
75 percentile 13,293 14,381 14,994 18,364 9.495 9.574 9.615 9.818
Median 11,466 12,335 12,922 15,469 9.347 9.420 9.467 9.647
25 percentile 9,961 10,508 11,086 13,073 9.206 9.260 9.313 9.478
10 percentile 8,649 8,861 9,449 11,009 9.065 9.089 9.154 9.306
No. of workers 103,277 125,836 127,035 138,219 103,277 125,836 127,035 138,219
6. Wages for workers 
aged 45–50 14,251 15,453 16,255 19,169 9.508 9.585 9.638 9.795
SD 5,236 5,770 6,002 7,772 0.327 0.339 0.332 0.351
90 percentile 21,462 23,417 24,497 29,579 9.974 10.061 10.106 10.295Table 7.6 looks at wage changes. The top panel shows the mean and dis-
tribution of individual wage changes: the average real wage change was be-
tween 4 and 5 percent, except in 1990 when it was close to zero. As for the
dispersion, there appears to be some variation over time, but not much to
indicate a trend.
Figure 7.6 and the second panel of table 7.6 show the distribution of
plant average wage changes using information on the workers that re-
mained in the plant for two consecutive years (from t – 1 to t). We see that
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75 percentile 16,254 17,854 18,562 21,767 9.696 9.790 9.829 9.988
Median 12,820 13,974 14,680 16,948 9.459 9.545 9.594 9.738
25 percentile 10,773 11,600 12,304 14,193 9.285 9.359 9.418 9.561
10 percentile 9,162 9,690 10,455 12,108 9.123 9.179 9.255 9.402
No. of workers 91,500 120,626 121,496 116,080 91,500 120,626 121,496 116,080
Notes: SD   standard deviation; CV   coeﬃcient of variation.
Data only include employees of plants with 25  employees in year t and t – 1.
aDeﬂation by CPI to 1990-SEK.
bData for 1986 do not include workers older than sixty-two or workers that emigrated or died before
1990.
Table 7.5 (continued)
Wages (1990-SEK)a Log wages (1990-SEK)a
1986b 1990 1995 2000 1986 1990 1995 2000
Fig. 7.5 Distribution of log real wage changes
Note: Deﬂated by CPI to 1990:SEK.Table 7.6 Wage changes
  Wages (1990 SEK:s)a   ln(Wages) (1990 SEK:s)a
1986b 1990 1995 2000 1986b 1990 1995 2000
1. Change in wages 610 46 638 898 0.048 0.004 0.045 0.048
SD 1,559 1,890 2,018 2,633 0.124 0.140 0.134 0.142
90 percentile 2,356 2,174 2,803 3,668 0.191 0.164 0.193 0.207
75 percentile 1,283 922 1,428 1,826 0.103 0.068 0.098 0.105
Median 503 –27 476 626 0.040 –0.002 0.034 0.038
25 percentile –108 –830 –195 –177 –0.009 –0.059 –0.014 –0.011
10 percentile –956 –1,920 –1,160 –1,434 –0.078 –0.139 –0.079 –0.085
No. of workers 586,057 665,982 623,679 704,360 586,057 665,982 623,679 704,360
2. Plant wage changec 666 122 565 948 0.054 0.010 0.041 0.053
SD 541 680 799 1,141 0.042 0.049 0.053 0.059
90 percentile 1,255 860 1,366 2,088 0.099 0.063 0.094 0.114
75 percentile 914 440 878 1,292 0.073 0.033 0.063 0.076
Median 617 90 484 763 0.052 0.008 0.037 0.047
25 percentile 368 –232 162 384 0.032 –0.016 0.014 0.024
10 percentile 138 –549 –148 30 0.013 –0.039 –0.008 0.001
No. of plants 7,037 8,296 7,521 9,063 7,037 8,296 7,521 9,063
3. Within plant SD 1,402 1,713 1,738 2,197 0.113 0.128 0.120 0.126
SD 483 553 690 980 0.029 0.033 0.035 0.039
90 percentile 2,008 2,393 2,614 3,417 0.151 0.170 0.164 0.176
75 percentile 1,627 1,986 2,059 2,605 0.130 0.147 0.140 0.147
Median 1,322 1,632 1,615 1,975 0.111 0.127 0.117 0.122
25 percentile 1,078 1,346 1,275 1,553 0.093 0.107 0.096 0.100
10 percentile 890 1,112 1,000 1,231 0.078 0.089 0.078 0.082
No. of plants 7,035 8,294 7,519 9,054 7,035 8,294 7,519 9,054
4. Wage change if 
changed plant 524 –129 742 1,069 0.037 –0.015 0.047 0.053
SD 2,302 2,671 3,179 4,026 0.174 0.194 0.197 0.213
90 percentile 3,243 2,979 4,382 5,727 0.254 0.221 0.292 0.319
75 percentile 1,703 1,358 2,347 3,133 0.135 0.099 0.155 0.175
Median 452 –110 664 913 0.035 –0.008 –0.044 0.051
25 percentile –700 –1,595 –789 –1,049 –0.055 –0.122 –0.053 –0.063
10 percentile –2,168 –3,348 –2,771 –3,525 –0.184 –0.269 –0.195 –0.218
No. of workers 23,659 28,824 21,477 40,217 23,659 28,824 21,477 40,217
5. Wage change if 
tenure 1–3 years 444 1,073 1,542 0.037 0.083 0.089
SD 1,984 2,316 2,965 0.155 0.163 0.164
90 percentile 2,769 3,765 4,837 0.228 0.292 0.292
75 percentile 1,460 2,186 2,793 0.118 0.165 0.170
Median 336 845 1,178 0.027 0.063 0.073
25 percentile –569 –30 108 –0.044 –0.002 0.007
10 percentile –1,659 –1,046 –1,151 –0.128 –0.075 –0.071
No. of workers 230,789 172,967 224,083 230,789 172,967 224,083
6. Wage change if 
tenure  3 years –168 458 555 –0.013 0.029 0.027
SD 1,726 1,773 2,192 0.121 0.113 0.115
90 percentile 1,635 2,213 2,637 0.113 0.142 0.141
75 percentile 603 1,150 1,312 0.043 0.078 0.075the dispersion of wage changes between plants, as measured by the stan-
dard deviation of plant wage changes, increased over time. As a contrast,
it is shown in the third panel that the dispersion of wage changes within
plants (the mean of the standard deviation of wage changes within a plant)
was relatively stable. Thus, the results suggest that the rate of real wage
changes increasingly varies between plants, but that the variation of wage
changes has remained stable within plants.
The bottom three panels of table 7.6 show the distribution of wage
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Median –175 378 446 –0.013 0.027 0.027
25 percentile –915 –233 –252 –0.064 –0.016 –0.015
10 percentile –1,950 –1,131 –1,387 –0.136 –0.077 –0.081
No. of workers 403,369 429,235 440,060 406,369 429,235 440,060
Notes: See table 7.5 notes.
aDeﬂation by CPI to 1990-SEK.
bData for 1986 do not include workers older than sixty-two or workers that emigrated or died before
1990.
cAverage change in wage (or log wage) for workers that worked in the plant in both t and t – 1.
Table 7.6 Wage changes
  Wages (1990 SEK:s)a   ln(Wages) (1990 SEK:s)a
1986b 1990 1995 2000 1986b 1990 1995 2000
Fig. 7.6 Distribution of plant average log wages for workers who remain in the
same plant
Note: Deﬂated by CPI to 1990:SEK.changes separately for diﬀerent tenure groups: (1) for those that changed
plants (from one plant in the sample to another), (2) for those with short
(one to three years) tenure, and (3) for long-tenured (  three years) work-
ers. The tables show, as expected, that wage increases are smaller for work-
ers with long tenure than for workers with shorter tenure. The wage in-
creases for workers that change plants are smaller than average at the start
of the period, but larger at the end of the period. This observation seems
consistent with the observed increase in the importance of plant eﬀects.
However, it should also be noted that the dispersion of wage changes is
much larger for those that change plants, suggesting important diﬀerences
between voluntary and involuntary worker separations. It is important to
keep in mind that the analysis is based on raw diﬀerences and that the prob-
ability of changing plants may be correlated with other characteristics that
may aﬀect the rate of wage growth, such as age or education.
7.4.3 Mobility
We now take a look at worker mobility at the plant level. The entry rateis
deﬁned as the share of workers in a plant in year t that did not work in the
plant in t – 1. Correspondingly, the exit rate is deﬁned as the share of work-
ers in a plant in year t – 1 that did not remain in the same plant in year t.
The top panels of table 7.7 shows some background statistics. We see an
increase in the number of plants over time (top panel) and some decrease
in the average number of employees per plant (the second panel) consistent
with the declining average plant size we described in section 7.3. The third
panel shows the employment growth rates of the plants and by comparing
the left part of the table (all 25 sized plants) with the right side (only 100 
sized plants) it is clear the smaller plants had higher growth rates than
larger plants during this period.
Comparing the exit rates depending on the size of the plant in the fourth
and ﬁfth panels, we see that there are fewer exits in the largest plants; pre-
sumably this is because they can provide more career opportunities than
smaller organizations.
In the following panels (6 and following), we show exit and entry rates
for diﬀerent parts of the plant wage distribution. It is clear that most of the
mobility takes place in the lower part of a plant’s wage distribution, both
in terms of exit and entry. Exit rates in the top quartile are in the order of
13 to 18 percent, whereas exit rates in the bottom quartiles are between 
26 and 36 percent. The corresponding numbers for entry rates are 10 to 14
percent in the top quartile and 40 to 44 percent in the bottom quartile.
Thus, there is relatively more entry than exits at the lower part of the plant
wage distribution and relatively more exits than entry at the higher part 
of the wage distribution, suggesting that workers to some extent enter at
lower wage levels and get promoted to higher wage levels before leaving the
plant.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0The most important development over time seems to be some procycli-
cality, in terms of entry rates and exit rates. In both the (relative) slump
years of 1986 and 1995, we see that exits as well as entries were relatively
uncommon (panels 5 to 16) and the fraction of high-tenured workers was
relatively large in 1995 (panel 17).
The six bottom panels (18 to 25) of table 7.7 show correlations between
entry and exit rates and diﬀerent aspects of the plants wage distributions.
In calculating these correlations we use the log wages, the standard devia-
tion of log wages, and the log wage changes (for those remaining in the
plant between year t and t – 1). The purpose is to describe the relationship
between wage levels and wage structures on one side and mobility on the
other side.
The correlations between average wage and exit rates are negative in the
ﬁrst years, but they grew over time, and for the large plant sample, they are
positive for the last two years. The correlation between average wage change
and exit rates ﬂuctuates substantially between the years and even change
signs. Exit rates are in all cases positively correlated with the standard devi-
ation of wages, and this correlation appears to be growing over time.
As for the entry rates, the correlation with the average wage is similar to
that for exit rates; it starts out negative but is positive at the end of the 
period. High entry rates also appear to be positively correlated with wage
growth as well as with within-plant wage dispersion, and at least in the case
of dispersion, increasingly so over time.
Appendix A shows tables that depict high- and low-level jobs separately.
High-level jobs are deﬁned as jobs paying more than the 80th percentile of
the wage distribution in the data and low-level jobs are deﬁned as the jobs
paying less than the 20th percentile of the distribution. The story told by
these numbers is essentially the same as in table 7.7: both entry and exits
are more common for low-level jobs and less common for high-level jobs,
with a more pronounced pattern for entries. The main diﬀerence seems to
be that the correlation between mobility and the plant wages, wage
changes, and wage dispersion all are more positive for high-level jobs.
This concludes the snapshots of wages and mobility. The most notewor-
thy observation is the rise in between-plant wage dispersion, whereas the
within dispersion has remained largely constant. The next section takes a
closer look at this development.
7.5 The Evolution of the Wage Structure
Figure 7.7 shows the overall log wage variance throughout the time pe-
riod for the entire economy, for the corporate sector, for the private corpo-
rate sector, and for manufacturing. The ﬁgure clearly shows that the wage
dispersion has increased quite consistently for all of these except for man-
ufacturing, where the dispersion has been relatively stable.
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tween plants may play an important role in explaining the growing wage
dispersion in Sweden since the mid-1980s. The purpose of this section is to
study in some detail the changing role that plants have played in explaining
the growing wage dispersion between workers in the Swedish economy.
7.5.1 Within- and between-Plant Components
We start by looking at how the share of log wage variance that can be at-
tributed to plant-speciﬁc factors has changed over time. Figure 7.8 shows
that the between-plant variance as a share of overall variance has increased
steadily throughout the period. The development is equally visible when
studying the entire economy as when studying only the corporate sector.
There is also a steady increase in the importance of plant eﬀects when fo-
cusing only on the manufacturing sector, even though the increase is less
pronounced in that sector. Throughout the rest of this section, we will fo-
cus on plants in the corporate sector. However, we will include the entire
corporate sector regardless of ownership (see the discussion in the begin-
ning of the previous section).
Interestingly, it is the increase in between-plant variance that makes up
the entire increase in wage dispersion over the period. Figure 7.9shows the
evolution of within-plant variance, which contains a slightly cyclical pat-
tern, but has no trend.
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Fig. 7.7 Overall log (wage) varianceFig. 7.8 Fraction of total variance explained by plant eﬀects
Fig. 7.9 Within-plant varianceIt is possible that the increase in between-plant variance is due to
changes in the industry composition. Thus, in ﬁgure 7.10 we decompose
the between-plant variance in two parts, between plants within the same
two-digit industry and between two-digit industries.11 The ﬁgure clearly
shows an increase in both the wage variances between plants in the same
industry and between industries. We have also looked at the variance be-
tween plants within the same ﬁrm; this variance is small (because many
ﬁrms just have one plant) but increasing.
As a (very) rough formal analysis of time trends for diﬀerent industries,
we estimated time trend estimates for the entire economy as well as sepa-
rately for all one-digit industries. The results (not displayed) showed that
all industries had positive trends in between-plant variances, while only
three industries had trends in within-plant variances. To further assess the
role of structural change, we have looked separately at all plants that ex-
isted in 1985 or 2000, as well as divided these plants by employment growth
rates. All the results from these experiments suggested that the growing
diﬀerence between plants is driven by increased diﬀerences between plants
in the wages they pay, rather than by changes in the composition of plants
in the economy.
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11. We use “reduced” two-digit industry codes that are the lowest level at which it is pos-
sible to get consistent industry classiﬁcations throughout the period (new codes were issued
in 1992). Thus, the corporate sector is divided into thirty-nine industries.
Fig. 7.10 Between-plant components: Corporate sector7.5.2 The Role of Sorting and Observed Human Capital Attributes
The increased between-plant wage inequality may have occurred for two
very diﬀerent reasons. First, it may be due to increased sorting of workers
by observed and unobserved skills so that high-skilled and low-skilled
workers to an increasing degree are found in diﬀerent plants. Another pos-
sibility is increased importance of “true” plant eﬀects, such as eﬀects op-
erating via rent sharing at the plant level. For example, between-plant wage
dispersion is likely to rise if wages at the plant level become more respon-
sive to plant-speciﬁc price and productivity conditions.
To get a ﬁrst look at the importance of sorting according to skill, we will
include traditional observable human capital variables (age, age squared,
education, gender, and immigration status) in a Mincer-type regression.
The results from the regressions can be found in appendix B. As has al-
ready been shown in, for example, Gustavsson (2006), the explanatory
power of observable characteristics has declined over time.
We proceed by including plant-ﬁxed eﬀects in the Mincer equation and
calculate the ﬁxed eﬀects R2 (explanatory power), deﬁned as the fraction of
total residual variance attributed to the plant eﬀects. This fraction cap-
tures the additional explanatory power of plant eﬀects after controlling for
observable characteristics.12 The results displayed in ﬁgure 7.11 show that
the plants play an increasingly important role after controlling for observ-
able skills: there is a trend increase in the fraction of residual variance at-
tributed to plant eﬀects. We also calculate the correlation between the ﬁxed
eﬀects and the prediction from observables and take this as a measure of
the degree of sorting on observables in order to answer the question: to
what extent do individuals with high earnings potential work in plants with
large plant eﬀects? Figure 7.11 reveals an increase in the degree of sort-
ing: workers with favorable observed human capital attributes show an in-
creasing tendency to work in high paying plants.
How should these patterns be interpreted? There is clearly evidence of
increased sorting on observed skills, and there is a presumption that this
also is associated with more sorting on unobserved skills. Conclusions
about the development of true plant eﬀects are more problematic, however,
because such conclusions would require that the observed human capital
characteristics capture all skill diﬀerences between individuals, which
seems like a rather strong assumption.13
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12. The fraction is formally equivalent to what Kremer and Maskin (1996) refer to as an in-
dex of segregation (or correlation) by worker skill.
13. Figure 7.11 also shows that observed human capital variables can explain less of the
within-plant variance over time. However, using the within-estimated coeﬃcients to calculate
the between R2, we see no evidence of a trend, suggesting that the between-plant variance of
observables has increased relative to the within-plant variance. We interpret this as further
support to the notion of increased sorting.7.5.3 Plant Eﬀects and Skill Levels
We noted already in section 7.4 that the variance of log wages within a
plant is correlated with the average log wage of that plant and that this may
reﬂect the skewness of the log wage distribution. Thus, we may be inter-
ested in the changing role of plants in diﬀerent parts of the skill distribu-
tion. We study this by dividing the sample of individuals into quartiles of
predicted wages from the estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) Mincer
equations. Figure 7.12 shows an interesting pattern; the plant eﬀects be-
come increasingly important for all quartiles except the top predicted
quartile.14 Thus, it appears that the increasing importance of plant eﬀects
is a feature of all parts of the skill distribution except at the most highly
skilled quartile. Plant eﬀects were clearly most important for the highest-
skilled workers at the beginning of the time period; but at the end of the pe-
riod, there were little or no diﬀerences between diﬀerent parts of the skill
distribution. This suggests that changes in bargaining institutions may
have been a factor of importance. For white-collar workers in the top of the
earnings distribution, there has typically been considerable scope for indi-
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14. It should be noted that the pattern of increased plant eﬀect R2s can be replicated using
only males. Thus, it is not likely that the diﬀerences between predicted wage quartiles are
driven by diﬀerent time patterns for men and women.
Fig. 7.11 Plant eﬀects when controlling for observables
Notes: The estimated (year-speciﬁc) model is lnW(i,j,t)   X (i,t) b (t)   FE (j,t)   e (i,j,t),
where X is education (six dummies), age, age squared, gender, and immigration status. FE is
a plant ﬁxed eﬀect and e the error term. For estimates, see appendix C.vidual bargaining with the employer, and the national wage agreements
have been less relevant for those workers than for other groups. A specula-
tive interpretation of ﬁgure 7.12 would be that a gradual erosion of the bite
of national wage agreements has made wage-setting processes more simi-
lar across skill groups, with a tendency to emulate practices among the
workers with the highest pay.
7.5.4 Wage Changes and Mobility
So far this section has focused entirely on wage levels. However, changes
in the variance between plants in wages may have implications for both
wage changes and mobility. In ﬁgure 7.13 we study the fraction of wage
growth variance that can be attributed to plant eﬀects for the diﬀerent
years (using only workers who remain in the same plant). The pattern is less
obvious than when studying wage levels, but there is a marked shift in
plant-speciﬁc wage growth in the beginning of the 1990s. This pattern also
remains after controlling for observables. The strongest pattern emerging
from the ﬁgure is, however, an increased sorting on observables (measured
as the correlation between observed human capital and plant-ﬁxed eﬀects)
starting in the mid-1990s, where workers with high predicted wage growth
rates (e.g., young workers) increasingly sort themselves to plants with high
residual wage growth rates. However, it should be noted that, as is evident
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Fig. 7.12 Fraction of variance explained by plant eﬀects by predicted wage quar-
tile in the corporate sector
Note: Quartiles of predicted wages from regressions on education (six dummies), age, age
squared, immigration status, and gender.from ﬁgure 7.13, the within-plant predictive power of the observables is
quite small (in the order of 1 to 3 percent).
In section 7.4, we noted what appeared to be increased wage changes for
those who changed plants relative to the average wage change. However,
when studying the time pattern throughout the period, it is apparent that
the diﬀerence is highly volatile, with little evidence of a trend (in most cases,
the diﬀerences are insigniﬁcant), a picture that also remains after control-
ling for observable characteristics. What appears to be a robust pattern,
however, is a procyclicality of the fraction of workers observed in the data
in two consecutive years who have changed plants between the years (see
ﬁgure 7.14). The fraction of workers changing jobs in 1993 is roughly half
that in 1988 and 2000.
7.5.5 The Dynamics of Plant Wages
It appears clear that wages have become more dispersed between plants
in the cross-section. In this subsection, we study whether the same is true for
the time dimension—that is, does the apparent increase in cross-sectional
ﬂexibility also mean that average plant wages are more volatile over time?
We have computed the year-by-year correlations of plant log wages. The
correlations are displayed in ﬁgure 7.15 and vary between 0.92 and 0.96
with a marked procyclical pattern—the four years with the lowest corre-
lations are 1991 to 1994—but with no trend. Thus, plant-speciﬁc wages do
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Fig. 7.13 Real wage growth and plant eﬀects
Notes:The overall plant R2is the between-plant variance of changes divided by total variance
of changes in log wages. The other statistics are based on the estimated (year-speciﬁc) model
d lnW(i,j,t)   X (i,t) b (t)   FE ( j,t)   e (i,j,t), where i is for individual, j for plant, and t for
time (year). X includes education (six dummies), age, age squared, gender, and immigration
status. FE is a plant-ﬁxed eﬀect and e the error term.Fig. 7.14 Mobility and wage gains
Notes: Data include only workers in plants with 25  employees in year t and t – 1. “Fraction
moving” is fraction of included workers that changed plant between t and t – 1.
Fig. 7.15 Year-to-year correlations of plant log wagesnot ﬂuctuate more in 2000 than they did in 1985, even though wages are
more dispersed in the cross section.
A main drawback of our data is the lack of information on productivity
at the plant level. It is not possible, therefore, to examine how plant wages
respond to changes in value productivity. However, because our results
show that wages do not ﬂuctuate more, but are more dispersed in the cross-
section, it is suggested that either wages do not follow productivity more
closely now (on a year-by-year basis at least), or wages follow productivity
more, but the time variability in productivity has been reduced.
7.6 Discussion
We have documented a continuous increase in between-plant wage in-
equality since the mid-1980s. This increase holds in the raw data but also
after controls for observable human capital attributes. It holds within in-
dustries as well as between plants in diﬀerent industries. It is also interest-
ing to note that the development is visible in all parts of the (observed) skill
distribution except for the most highly skilled workers.
How can this development be explained? One possibility is increased
sorting of workers by skill. Other possibilities revolve around rent sharing
and what we have referred to as true plant eﬀects. Suppose that wage ne-
gotiations have gradually become more decentralized, with increased bar-
gaining power for local unions. This could cause an increase in wage dis-
persion as wages adjust to plant-level productivity, recognizing that plant
productivity levels typically are much more dispersed than wages. Another
twist on the rent-sharing theme is that the dispersion of plant productivity
has increased, something that would translate into more wage dispersion
to the extent that there is some scope for rent sharing at the plant level. We
discuss these possibilities in turn.
7.6.1 Sorting by Skill
The segregation by skill theory of Kremer and Maskin (1996) is con-
cerned with the idea that a rise in the overall (mean) skill levels may be ac-
companied by a rise in wage inequality as well as a rise in segregation across
plants of workers of diﬀerent skills. Key assumptions are that workers of
diﬀerent skills are imperfect substitutes, diﬀerent tasks within a plant are
complementary, and diﬀerent tasks diﬀer in their sensitivity to skill. The
distribution of worker skills is exogenous, and the competitive economy
operates under constant returns. The equilibrium wage distribution de-
pends on skill distribution, but also on how workers of diﬀerent skills are
matched with one another. The model predicts that a rise in the dispersion
of the skill distribution will cause increased segregation of workers. More-
over, a rise in the mean of the skill distribution increases wage inequality
across plants when the skill distribution is suﬃciently dispersed.
248 Oskar Nordström Skans, Per-Anders Edin, and Bertil HolmlundKremer and Maskin (1996) provide empirical evidence that suggests
that segregation by skill has become increasingly prevalent in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France over the 1980s and the 1990s.
There is, furthermore, some evidence from data on U.S. states that segre-
gation by skill is ampliﬁed by increased variance of skills, consistent with
the theory.
The level of education has increased substantially in Sweden in re-
cent decades. Between 1970 and 2000, the fraction of the population with
upper-secondary education increased from 30 to 50 percent, and the frac-
tion with tertiary education from 7 to 30 percent (Björklund et al. 2005).
Has there also been an increase in the dispersion of education? If so, the
Kremer and Maskin (1996) theory would predict increased segregation by
skill, consistent with what we observe in the Swedish data.
We have transformed our data on education levels into years of school-
ing and computed the variance of schooling using all individuals in the
data. The results are displayed in ﬁgure 7.16 and reveal a marked increase
in the variance of schooling from the early 1990s and onward (but a slight
decline in the late 1980s). Although this pattern is broadly consistent with
the Kremer and Maskin (1996) theory, the exercise certainly does not
demonstrate a causal relationship between the dispersion of education and
segregation of workers by observed and unobserved skill, or between the
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Fig. 7.16 Variance in years of schooling
Notes: Years of schooling calculated as less than compulsory, eight years; compulsory, nine
years; two-year high school, eleven years; three-year high school, twelve years; some univer-
sity, thirteen years; university, ﬁfteen years; graduate studies, nineteen years. Data is for the
entire Swedish population aged sixteen to sixty-ﬁve each year.dispersion of skills and between-plant wage inequality. At the very least,
the results suggest that future work on the sources of increased wage in-
equality in Sweden should explore how changes in the level and dispersion
of schooling have aﬀected employers’ incentives to match workers of
diﬀerent skills in the same plants.
7.6.2 Decentralization of Wage Bargaining
In a standard bargaining framework, the bargained wage is determined
by “inside” and “outside” factors. The former include measures of the
plant’s ability to pay, the latter overall labor market conditions. Imagine a
plant-level wage negotiation between an employer and a local union. The
stronger the local union is, the more responsive would the bargained wage
be with respect to the plant’s ability to pay. The power of the local union
will be constrained not only by a strong bargaining position of the em-
ployer but also by a central union that is able to strike wage agreements at
the national or industry level. The more centralized the wage bargaining
system, the weaker the links between plant-speciﬁc productivity factors
and wage agreements at the local level. And, conversely, the less centralized
the bargaining system, the more scope for local rent sharing.
A number of studies have examined this hypothesis using data on plants
or industries.15 By and large, most studies ﬁnd that rent sharing has been
of limited importance in Sweden. There is so far little hard evidence that
increasingly decentralized wage negotiations have changed this pattern.
Forslund and Lindh (2004) used plant data for Swedish mining and manu-
facturing and looked at the cross-sectional relationship between plant
wages and plant productivity, measured as the nominal value added per
employee. In regressions for each year for the period 1970 to 1996, they re-
lated log wages to log productivity. The estimated coeﬃcient on productiv-
ity was closely centered on 0.05. The mean of the estimates was 0.055 for
the period 1970 to 1982 and 0.051 for the period 1983 to 1996. The authors
report that panel data regressions produce similar estimates. There is no in-
dication in this study that wages have become more responsive to plant-
level productivity despite the fact that wage negotiations arguably have be-
come more decentralized since the mid-1980s. Unfortunately, because our
data do not include any plant-level productivity measures, it is not possible
to shed new light on this hypothesis.
7.6.3 Product Markets and Ability to Pay
An increase in the productivity dispersion across plants may cause an in-
crease in between-plant wage inequality as long as there is some scope for
local rent sharing. The recent paper by Dunne et al. (2004) brings new ev-
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15. Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) exploit industry data, whereas ﬁrm data are used by
Arai (2003), Forslund (1994), and Forslund and Lindh (2004).idence on this issue in a study of wage and productivity dispersion in U.S.
manufacturing. The study exploits establishment data over the 1975 to
1992 period and ﬁnds that almost all of the increase in hourly wage dis-
persion is accounted for by an increase in the between-plant component.
Interestingly, the study also documents an increase in the between-plant
distribution of productivity over the same period. Moreover, wages and
productivity at the plant level are strongly positively correlated, both in lev-
els and changes. The paper also ﬁnds that an important source of the rise
in wage and productivity dispersion between plants is accounted for by
changes in the distribution of computer investment across plants.
Data on the evolution of the productivity dispersion across Swedish
plants are rare. Some information is oﬀered by Forslund and Lindh (2004),
who computed a productivity measure (the standard deviation of log value
productivity) for mining and manufacturing. Interestingly, there is a trend
rise in productivity dispersion, especially from the early 1980s and onward.
To the extent that this development holds for the private sector as a whole,
it may help explain the rise in between-plant wage inequality.
7.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has provided new evidence on the evolution of wage dis-
persion in Sweden, with particular focus on dispersion within and between
plants. We use linked employer-employee data and ﬁnd a striking trend in-
crease in between-plant wage inequality since the mid-1980s. Interestingly,
this trend in between-plant variance makes up the entire increase in wage
dispersion over the period.
The increase in wage dispersion between plants is not only present in the
raw data, but also when we control for workers’ human capital character-
istics. Thus, sorting by observed characteristics can only explain part of the
increase. We ﬁnd that the basic pattern holds within industries as well as
between plants in diﬀerent industries. Also, increasing between-plant wage
dispersion has been substantial throughout the individual wage distribu-
tion, except for individuals at the top of the distribution. Overall, our re-
sults suggest that the growing diﬀerence between plants is driven by in-
creased diﬀerences between plants in the wages they pay, rather than by
changes in the composition of plants in the economy.
It lies close at hand to suspect that a gradual evolution toward more de-
centralized wage-bargaining practices is a factor of importance. Our data
are, however, not rich enough to test alternative hypotheses concerning the
mechanisms behind the rise in wage inequality between plants. It is pre-
mature, therefore, to identify the causes of the rise in between-plant wage
inequality. To make progress on this front, we need more information on
plant characteristics and, in particular, measures of (value) productivity at
the plant level.
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